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Performance
Management in Workers'
Compensation Systems
interest in performance measurement
and performance management has
expanded remarkably in the past 25
years. This interest has spawned many
initiatives, both private and public. One
of the most ubiquitous has been the
"balanced scorecard," which developed
out of the work of two professors at'
the Harvard Business School in the
early 1990s, Robert Kaplan and David

The "balanced scorecard"
was based on the fundamental
concept that since there
are multiple organizational
objectives, there should also
be multiple dimensions of
performance measurement.
Norton. It was based on the fundamental
concept that since there are (or should
be) multiple organizational objectives,
there should also be multiple dimensions
of performance measurement (Kaplan
and Norton 1992). Kaplan and Norton
urged that the financial perspective be
complemented by a customer perspective,
an internal process perspective, and
an organizational learning and growth
perspective. Only then could performance
measurement fully serve the strategic
objectives of the modern enterprise

(see Kaplan and Norton 2001).
While the balanced scorecard was
finding application in private business,
nonprofits, and local government entities,
the federal government was conducting
a national performance review under
the leadership of Vice President Al Gore
(1993). This gave a boost to legislation
enacted under the title of the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993,
or GPRA. GPRA is the latest in a series
of government attempts at "performance
management," including the PlanningProgramming-Budgeting System (PPBS)
of 1965, Management by Objectives of
1973, and Zero-Base Budgeting of 1977
(see U.S. Government Accounting Office
[USGAO]1997).
However, GPRA differs from those
earlier federal efforts in that it also
imposes a planning and evaluation
process designed to measure program
effectiveness and influence budgeting
decisions. Five-year strategic plans are
required from all federal agencies (with
revision every three years), together
with an annual performance plan that
has credible outcome-based goals.
In addition, these "good intentions"
are being monitored by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)
Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART), which is being applied across
all federal government agencies and
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programs on a five-year cycle. In fact,
the Office of Management and Budget
conducted PART evaluations on 234
federal programs during fiscal year 20022003 and planned to complete 400 by the
end of fiscal year 2004.
PART rates programs as "effective,
moderately effective, adequate, results
not demonstrated, or ineffective" based
on four criteria. Twenty percent of the
evaluation is based on management, 20
percent on program purpose and design,
10 percent on planning, and 50 percent
on program results (USGAO 2004).
While it is too early to judge the ultimate
success of PART or GPRA, they certainly
demonstrate growing interest in program
effectiveness and program evaluation in
the federal government and elsewhere
(see USGAO 2004 for a critical view).
No less an authority than Richard P.

While it is too early to
judge the ultimate success
of PART or GPRA, they
demonstrate growing interest
in program effectiveness and
program evaluation in
the federal government
and elsewhere.
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standard that defines acceptable levels of
performance. For example, examine the
International Association of Industrial
Accident Boards and Commission
Information Product Award winner for
2003 in the "program improvement
category."
Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation
Board (WCB)
The Nova Scotia WCB Performance
Measurement and Management System
(PMMS) emphasizes empowering
WCB employees by giving them the
necessary information to align their
personal work goals with organizational
objectives. This is illustrated in Figure
1, which shows the conceptual model
underlying the PMMS. It indicates that
the goals of the organization are defined
from the top down, but performance
accumulates from the bottom up, as
individual performances add up to team
performance, which, in turn, sums to unit
and then department performance. All
departments taken together constitute
corporate outcomes.
The PMMS system uses specific

performance bands to define expected
performance norms based on past
experience. These "dashboard indicators"
define adequate (green), marginal
(yellow), and unacceptable (red)
performance for each performance
measure and at each organizational level.
In this way, individuals or teams with
performance problems can be identified
and targeted for additional training or
assistance.
The primary PMMS performance
indicators are
timeliness,
return-to-work outcomes,
claim durations,
claim costs,
staff availability, and
stakeholder satisfaction.
The system is a proprietary, Webbased application designed to assign each
user the necessary level of access, as
well as the appropriate performance level
indicators. Thus, individual caseworkers
may access their own monthly
performance results, as well as their
team, unit, and department performance
results, but they cannot access another

Figure 1 Performance Model for Nova Scotia PMMS

Nathan, in his recent presidential address
to the Association for Public Policy
Analysis and Management, suggested
"Let's not part with PART" as an
appropriate slogan for the 2004 election
season.
"State of the Art" Performance
Measurement in Workers'
Compensation Systems
Workers' compensation systems
have not been perceived as among the
leaders in developing performance
measurement tools. There are, however,
a number of impressive performance
measurement systems currently in place
throughout the workers' compensation
world. These performance measurement
systems are specifically designed to
support the management of the workers'
compensation function. They include
targets or goals, with an accountability

Individual Performance

———t———
Measurement & Management
Key Performance Measures

———t——Corporate Goals/Objectives

SOURCE: Nova Scotia WCB.
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individual's results. Similarly, team
managers have access to results for their
departments, units, and teams, plus the
individuals in the team, but not for other
teams or individuals. There are seven
distinct levels of security access built into
this system.
For each performance area, the
software permits "drill-thru" to more
refined or specific measures. For
example, the corporate timeliness of
payment measure allows drill-thru to the
five different client service units, which
are organized geographically. Data (and
dashboard indicators) are displayed
for the current month and the previous
month, as well as the threshold levels for
green, yellow, and red indicators. Human
contact for more information is also
listed. Individual worker-level data are
displayed for the last eight measurement
periods (typically months). This permits

Lost production days is the
ultimate performance measure
for a workers' compensation
agency, because it represents
both the incidence of claims and
their severity or duration.
easy identification of performance
trends and enables quick intervention for
remedial efforts or workload rebalancing.
The PMMS system also produces
management information reports
that support day-to-day operational
management. For instance, there is a
"Medium High Caseload Report," which
identifies units, teams, or individuals
with relatively high caseloads. The report
assigns each claim a status and weight
based on specific activities happening
with the claim. The system is designed to
represent the amount of effort that would
typically be required for a case of that
status. Management can then work with
this list to maintain more equitable file
distribution and resultant work burden.
The WCB of Nova Scotia reports
that employee users indicate that the
software tool is "intuitive and relevant
to their work." Eighty-five percent of
staff surveyed in 2002 indicated that they
understood their personal performance
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targets. The board of directors has also
expressed a high level of satisfaction with
the information they receive monthly
from PMMS. The bottom line is that
timeliness to first payment improved
from 60.5 percent in May 2002 to 81.5
percent in May 2003.
Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, U.S. Department of Labor

The Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs (OWCP) in the U.S.
Department of Labor has developed
what may be the best single outcome
measure for a workers' compensation
agency. Lost production days is the
ultimate performance measure for a
workers' compensation agency because
it simultaneously represents both the
incidence of claims and their severity or
duration. A reduction in lost production
days is clearly a good thing for both
workers and their agencies. In response
to the pressures generated by GPRA,
OWCP decided to measure production
days lost due to workers' compensation
claims in the federal employing agencies,
and to evaluate OWCP performance in
terms of reducing average lost production
days.2
This system was originally
implemented as a way to track

performance under the Quality Case
Management program, a nurse-based
case management system designed to
return long-term Federal Employees
Compensation Act (FECA) claimants to
employment. Using this measurement to
manage performance over time appears
to have been very effective as the average
duration reduction has been nearly 20
percent over an eight-year period. This
is confirmed by the fact that the lost
production days measure was extended
to the entire FECA program in fiscal year
2001. It has subsequently been adopted
under the President's Safety, Health and
Return-to-Employment initiative for
all federal employees for 2004-2006.
OWCP reports results on this and other
performance measures by individual
agency on their Web site (http://www.dolesa.gov/share/).
Conclusions

Performance measurement has clearly
gained a (tenuous) foothold within some
workers' compensation systems in North
America. One gets the impression that
the "state of the art" is better in Canada
than in the United States. But perhaps
that impression results from the more
competitive workers' compensation
environment in the United States, which

Figure 2 Average Lost Production Days in Quality Case Management Program by
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor
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leads insurers to think of performance
measurement systems as a part of their
competitive advantage.
On the other hand, there are also
limits to the role of performance
measurement in workers' compensation
systems. First must come the dictum
that "what gets measured gets done."
However, the obverse question is, What
is not measured? It seems clear that
concentration on achieving one goal in
complex social systems like these will
likely come at the expense of alternative
goals. It may not be evident immediately,
but the time and energy that go into
achieving the stated goal will be diverted
from some other activity with an unstated
or unmeasured goal. This may or may
not be a problem, but the issue should
be carefully examined to make sure that
the net result is not a surprise (see Meyer
2002).
The other question is, What happens
when things go bad? The savvy executive
knows that is the time to change the
performance measurement system! On
the other hand, corporate and public
governance systems must develop
the capability to deal with this issue.
Performance goals should be potentially
achievable, or they will not motivate
better performance. But this means
goals must reflect the underlying reality,
and that reality may change rapidly. So
performance goals must also be flexible.
Finally, observers ask if performance
measurement is just "the flavor of the
month." This seems unlikely, since
it is part of a much broader trend in
government, education, and private
enterprise. But ultimately performance
measurement must be adopted by
stakeholders as an important part of
system management if it is to truly
reach its ultimate potential. It is still
very early in the history of performance
measurement in workers' compensation;
it remains to be seen how much effective
performance management it will lead to.
Researchers and policy analysts look
forward to watching this process unfold
over the next several years.

Notes
1. See Nathan's remarks at http://www.appam
.org/conferences/fall/atlanta2004/APPAM_
Presidential_Speech_04.pdf.
2. It should be noted that OWCP maintains a
number of other performance measures that are
not covered here. See U.S. Department of Labor
(2004a) for details.
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Workplace Justice
Without Unions
NOTE: This article draws upon research from the
authors' book, Workplace Justice Without Unions,
which was published last year by the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research. See http://www
.upjohninstitute.org/or information on how to order
the book.

"W,

here there is no rule of law
but only the command of persons, where
secrecy and arbitrariness reign, where one
never knows when or why the axe will
fall, there justice weeps" (Wolterstorff
2001).
Human dignity at the workplace
requires the right to just treatment by
those holding authority. At the crux of
this is protection from arbitrary action
action that is based upon personality
rather than merit, and is not predictable
on any reasoned basis. When a human
being is treated as merely a means
to an end, a thing to be employed by
others, rather than as a person deserving
justice, justice does indeed weep. This
is especially true where a person's job is
at stake. In our society, an individual's
job is not only the source of economic
goods, but also an important part of
how we define ourselves and others
define us and our role in society. Where
workers can be terminated from their
employment for any reason, or none
at all, arbitrariness reigns. Yet, this is
historically the basic principle of the law
of employment termination in the United
States.
Corporations are social organizations
arranged in a hierarchy in which those
at the top exercise authority over those
at the bottom. This inevitably means
that control must be exerted over those
who are employed by others. In such
circumstances, both human nature
and differing interests between the
employed and the employer give rise to
a situation in which an abuse of power
is not only possible, but highly likely.
In the workplace there are order givers

and order takers. One instrument of
control by order givers is the threat
of termination of the relationship.
Ultimately, employees who do not behave
as they are ordered will be separated from
the organization fired.
Fortunately, since the days when
the employment-at-will principle was
adopted by American courts in the late
nineteenth century, there has been a
considerable erosion of it. What has
occurred over a period of about 90
years is the construction of a patchwork
of limitations on employment-atwill. Yet, the employer's power is
still quite substantial. Arguably, it has
grown significantly by virtue of some
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
approving employer-mandated arbitration
(employment arbitration).

The Practice of Workplace Justice
A major development in the area of
workplace justice has been the adoption
of organizational justice procedures by
nonunion employers. The more advanced
forms of these procedures have come
along relatively recently. Based on
data gathered in the late 1970s, Fred
Foulkes (1980) found that by far the most
common employer device for handling
employee grievances at that time was
the open-door policy, which is a very
rudimentary workplace justice procedure.
More advanced forms of nonbinding
policies have included 1) installing
an ombudsman, a corporate employee
who independently deals with worker
problems; and 2) mediation, where a
neutral third party works to facilitate a
resolution of the dispute.
An especially interesting
organizational justice procedure
originated in the 1980s peer review
panels. Here, a panel of employees (and
sometimes managers) makes a final
decision or recommendation regarding an

employee's grievance.
The management-initiated
organizational justice system to
most recently rise to prominence is
employment arbitration. In employment
arbitration, a nonunion employer requires
employees to agree to submit any
complaints (or sometimes any allegations
of violation of law on the part of the
employer) to a neutral arbitrator who
will render a final and binding decision
on the matter. This is by far the most
controversial of these systems. The
fairness of employment arbitration has
been vigorously attacked on the grounds
that it deprives employees of their legal
right to go to court, and to a jury trial,
and substitutes an employer-mandated
system that is set up and controlled by the
employer.

Design of the Study
There is a substantial literature on
workplace justice; much of it relates
to employment arbitration. However,
a systematic analysis of this literature,
while useful, fails to produce any solid
conclusions with respect to the main
questions of interest. To remedy this,
we have gathered an extensive body of
new data in an attempt to move toward
clearer answers to the issues inherent
in these systems. The empirical portion
of our study has several aspects. First,
in order to judge the substantive results
obtained under these various procedures,
we analyze overall win/loss rates by
employees in a sample of termination
cases in labor arbitration and employment
arbitration and in a sample of cases from
federal courts.
Our second and most intensive
research strategy is our attempt to
determine the degree to which the same
result would be reached in the same cases
across different types of decision makers.
This is tested by posing hypothetical
scenarios to labor arbitrators,
employment arbitrators, managers,
members of peer review panels, jurors in
employment discrimination cases, and
labor court judges from other countries.
By analyzing the responses to these
scenarios, we can compare the harshness
or leniency of the systems toward
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employees for different disciplinary
offenses, and the criteria used to reach
decisions.

Results

JANUARY 2005

Table 1 Employee/Employer Win Rates
Procedure
Employment arbitration"
Overall
n = 2l6

Existing studies that evaluate
workplace justice systems by looking
at the win/loss rates by employees and
employers show that the results are
mixed. Probably the most striking result
is the low percentage of employee wins
in discrimination cases in federal courts.
When we analyzed data on win/loss
rates from our own sample of arbitration
awards and recent reports of federal court
decisions, we obtained the results set out
in Table 1.
Although comparing the overall
win rate of employees in employment
arbitration with those in the other
two procedural alternatives is of
some interest, the most meaningful
comparisons are between results in
particular categories of employment
arbitration cases and other systems. Our
most pertinent comparison is of court
cases involving claims of discrimination
in violation of a federal statute and
employment arbitration cases involving
that same claim.
In employment arbitration cases
where a federal discrimination statute
was involved, employees won 22 percent
of the cases. This compares to only 12
percent in federal district courts in the
most recent five-year period. Thus, the
chances of an employee winning would
appear to be much greater in employment
arbitration than in court when the case
goes to a final adjudication. However,
this does not take settlements into
account.
In labor arbitration cases under a
collective bargaining contract, unlike
court cases enforcing a federal statute,
the employer has the burden of proving
misconduct and the propriety of the
penalty. Usually the standard is proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.
However, more serious cases may require
proof by clear and convincing evidence,
or even proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The principal limitation on the kind
of analysis described so far is that it
does not hold constant the nature of the
cases decided upon in the various justice

Percent employee wins

'" '

Federal discrimination statute involved
n = 59
Employment contract
n = 52
Burden of proof on employer
« = 57
Labor arbitration15
n = 580
Federal district court0
1996-2000
n = 26,841
1987-2000
n = 53,248

Percent employer wins

33

67

22

78

56

44

60

40

52

48

12
16

"SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994-2002; American Arbitration
Association, Employment Dispute Arbitration Reports, 1999-2000.
b SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994-2002.
c SOURCE: Federal District-Court Civil Cases, 2001. See http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090.

systems. It is to this limitation that the
most intensive portion of our research
addresses itself. This stage of our study
consists of developing hypothetical cases
on termination of employment and asking
different types of decision makers to
indicate whether they would find in favor
of the employer or the employee if they
were deciding the case. We attempted not
only to discover tendencies to decide in
favor of either employees or employers,
but also to determine what were the
important factors that influence different
decision makers. The decision makers
to whom these hypothetical cases were
posed included employment arbitrators,
labor arbitrators, peer review panelists,
human resources officers, persons who
had served as jurors in discrimination
cases, and labor court judges from several
countries.
The results of our work on
hypothetical cases are complex. One
relatively simple set of findings that
provides something of an overall view of
the results indicates that, in response to
our hypothetical cases, the percentage of
cases decided in favor of employees was
greatest by labor arbitrators (55 percent)
and labor court judges (51 percent);
lowest for employment arbitrators,
both when they were deciding statutory
claims (25 percent) and when they were

applying a "for cause" requirement in
a contract of employment (33 percent);
and in between these extremes for HR
managers (46 percent), peer review
panelists (45 percent), and jurors (38
percent). So, holding constant the
particular cases decided produces results
that are quite different from the results of
looking at overall win/loss rates as we do
in Table 1. These bare results, although
useful, should be viewed with some
caution, and should be understood in the
context of the complete body of results
and analysis.
Professors Hoyt Wheeler, Brian Klaas, and Douglas
Mahony are faculty members at the Moore School
of Business, University of South Carolina.
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This volume reveals how, as a result
of policy reforms at the national, state,
and local levels, programming by
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professional
Communities
practices converged
and Workforce
to transform the
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services industry.
The contributors
show how these
reforms spurred
employment
service providers
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universal access, integration of federal
funding streams, devolution of policy
to local authorities, and work-first as a
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As a result, many new programs were
started by nontraditional institutions,
traditional programs underwent rapid
transformations, and some providers
exited the industry.
The studies presented here constitute
a first step toward a comprehensive
assessment of the role that community
organizations played in revamping the
employment services industry. Most
importantly, they show how a new
style of labor market intermediary
has evolved from focusing almost
exclusively on the provision of
employment services to job seekers to
simultaneously addressing the needs of
both job seekers and employers.
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of labor exchange policy in the United
States and summarizes the major findings
about the effectiveness of labor exchange
services. The book's contributors address
key issues concerning public labor
exchange, including 1) the evolution of
federal-state relations in labor exchange
policy resulting
from the Workforce
Investment Act
of 1998; 2) trends
affecting the delivery
of labor exchange
services by state
agencies, particularly
how they interact
with other public
programs; 3) the performance and
accountability mechanisms under which
employment service offices operate
and the effectiveness of employment
services in helping job seekers find jobs;
4) the growing number and assortment
of Internet-based tools and information
sources that help people find jobs; 5)
the international perspective on job
brokerage functions; and 6) the current
and future role of labor exchange
services.
In addition, the book examines the
appropriate role for government in
helping job seekers and employers make
the proper job match and provides an
overview of U.S. labor exchange policy
as it existed during the last three decades
of the twentieth century.
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The U.S. Department of Labor
began funding job training programs
some 40 years ago. The first of
these programs was the Manpower
Development and Training Act
(MDTA) in 1962, which was
followed by the
Comprehensive
Employment
and Training Act
(CETA) in 1973,
the Job Training
Partnership Act
(JTPA) in 1982,
and the Workforce
Investment Act
(WIA) in 1998. As one program
supplanted another, job training
evolved from having strong federal
control to substantial local authority,
from narrowly targeted services
to broadly available services, and
from proscribed training options to
significant customer choices.
This volume provides a broad
overview of federally funded job
training programs as they exist today.
The notable contributors review what
training consists of and how training
programs are implemented under WIA.
In particular, they examine training
service providers and methods of
delivering training services, including
the use of individual training accounts
and eligible training provider lists.
Performance management under
WIA is examined, as well as the
effectiveness of training programs. In
addition, public training programs are
compared to private training provided
in the United States and to public
training programs offered in other
industrial nations.
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